Recent Court Decisions

A public body violated Section 2.02(c) of OMA by voting to amend and approve a settlement agreement without including the general subject matter of the final action on the meeting agenda. The public body’s attorney was present at the meeting and specifically advised the public body that it could not take final action because the matter was not on the agenda, but the public body moved ahead with final action. The PAC ordered the public body to remedy this violation by reconsidering its final action on the settlement agreement at a properly noticed meeting with a proper agenda.

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

During a public meeting, the board voted to approve two items listed on its agenda as “X. Board Approval of Lease Rates” and “XI. Board Approval of Revised Covenants.” A member of the public then asked the board to describe what it had just voted on, and the board declined to. Plaintiffs then filed suit, alleging the board violated Section 2(e) of the Open Meetings Act by failing to make a sufficient public recital of items X and XI prior to voting on them. Section 2(e) of OMA specifically requires that final action “be preceded by a public recital of the nature of the matter being considered and other information that will inform the public of the business being conducted.” The appellate court found that plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim for an OMA violation and that their case would not be dismissed because “although we are unsure precisely what standard of specificity is required of a public recital, we can say with confidence that the Board’s actions in this case were insufficient.” The court reasoned that while “a detailed explanation about the significance or impact of the proposed final action” is not necessary, a public body must provide enough details to inform the public of the nature of the matter being considered.

A student and her parents sued the district for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of school bullying. Plaintiffs claimed the district breached a contract with the student by failing to enforce its anti-bullying policies as stated in the school handbook and athletic handbook. Plaintiffs further claimed the district’s actions were willful and wanton because the district allegedly acted with utter indifference and reckless disregard to the bullying conduct.

With regard to the breach of contract claims, the circuit court granted the district’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the creation and distribution of student handbooks did not establish the elements of contract formation even though the handbooks stated they “form contracts between the School, its students and their parents.” The appellate court affirmed, noting that the student handbook did not include any specific promise to prevent or eliminate bullying, or to take any particular action in any specific circumstance.

With regard to the willful and wanton conduct claim, the circuit court dismissed this claim on tort immunity grounds. The appellate court agreed, finding that Section 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act shielded the district from liability because how the district implemented and applied its anti-bullying policies were discretionary acts, not ministerial tasks, as the policies did not mandate a specific response to every set of circumstances. Moreover, it found that such policy determinations involve teachers and school administrators balancing various interests (including student safety interests), which meets the Illinois Supreme Court’s definition of policy decisions that fall within the tort immunity context.

A public body violated FOIA by improperly asserting that the requestor’s request was unduly burdensome under Section 3(g). The requestor requested all emails between a specific employee of the public body and a private planning/architecture firm during a one month period. The public body responded by asserting the request was unduly burdensome because it had discovered 50 responsive emails comprising nearly 174 pages of material, and it asked the requestor to narrow her request. When a public body asks a requestor to narrow his/her request because it believes the request is unduly burdensome, this constitutes a denial under Section 3(g) of FOIA. Using a balancing test to determine whether complying with a request is unduly burdensome, the PAC asked whether the public interest in disclosure of the requested records outweighs the burden of compliance on the public body. The PAC found the public body “did not demonstrate with specificity how the process of retrieving and reviewing these records would constitute a significant burden on its operations” such that it would outweigh the public interest in disclosure. The PAC ordered the public body to immediately disclose the requested emails, subject to appropriate redactions.

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

Though a public body provided copies of and properly exempted portions of some records responsive to FOIA requests from multiple requestors for information concerning a criminal complaint filed by a then-public official, the public body violated FOIA by improperly redacting and withholding other responsive records.

In redacting/withholding certain records, the public body invoked exemptions under FOIA Sections 7(1)(b), 7(1)(c), and 7(1)(d)(v). Section 7(1)(b) exempts private information from disclosure, and the PAC found that the public body properly withheld the account identification number and Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) for the public official’s Facebook page as private information. It found, however, that the public official’s Facebook and Skype account names could not be withheld because they are akin to or derived from his legal name.

Section 7(1)(c) exempts from disclosure personal information which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The PAC found the public body properly withheld the public official’s birth date, which it considers “highly personal by its very nature.” It also found the public body properly withheld portions of statements the public official made to police regarding the extortion crime he was a victim of, as well as the identities of suspects who were private citizens. The PAC, however, found that the public body should have disclosed the amounts of money involved in the extortion, especially because the public official had publicly acknowledged that he was extorted.

Section 7(1)(d)(v) exempts from disclosure law enforcement records that would disclose unique investigative techniques and which would result in demonstrable harm to the public body. Here, the public body withheld records pertaining to unique investigative techniques for gathering information from electronic and social media sources. The PAC found that disclosing such information would result in harm because it could enable perpetrators to evade detection. In contrast, the PAC found that the public body had improperly redacted information regarding routine investigative steps. Finally, the PAC found the public body had properly refused to disclose search warrants when the search warrants themselves expressly prohibited their disclosure.

The PAC ordered the public body to immediately disclose the non-exempt portions of additional records responsive to the requests. This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.