Recent Court Decisions

The court at the Board’s request dismissed this case. The superintendent brought claims for declaratory judgment, which alleged that the Board improperly dismissed her. She also brought a claim for breach of contract. The Board had good cause for the dismissal of the superintendent because she acted outside the scope of her authority by transferring “disruptive” students to alternative schools without board hearings for extended periods of time. These students were not given any other form of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Even if the practice of transferring students to alternative schools without a hearing was routinely done for years in the school district, this did not negate the superintendent’s responsibility to know the law and follow the School Code. If the Board had ulterior motives in terminating the superintendent, this did not negate the reasonable basis that existed for the superintendent’s dismissal.

The superintendent’s due process rights were not violated because there was no evidence to suggest that she did not receive an impartial hearing.

Shanell M. Bowden, IASB Law Clerk

The amount of compensation paid by the public body is subject to disclosure unless it is otherwise exempted. The amount of compensation by itself is not exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(b) of FOIA because it is not a “unique identifier” that could be considered private information. Additionally, the compensation information directly relates to the public body’s use of public funds and is also subject to disclosure pursuant to Section 2.5 of FOIA.

Residential addresses may be withheld under section 7(1)(b) but post office box numbers must be disclosed because they do not uniquely identify an individual or constitute a home address.

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

Shanell M. Bowden, IASB Law Clerk

The public body violated section 2a of OMA by failing to reveal and record in the meeting minutes that they were asserting section 2(c)(1) and section 2(c)(2) as its basis for closing a portion of its meeting.

The public body improperly discussed the elimination of an employee’s position for reasons unrelated to the performance of the employee, which is not within the scope of the section 2(c)(1) exceptions. In addition, discussion of a hiring freeze was not within the scope of the section 2(c)(2) exception. Because the county was not engaged in collective bargaining at the time of the meeting, the hiring freeze did not constitute a collective negotiating matter.

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

Shanell M. Bowden, IASB Law Clerk

The public body violated section 3(d) of FOIA by failing to respond to a request for records within five business days without a written agreement to extend the time for compliance.

The calendar the public body produced qualifies as a public record under section 2 (c) of FOIA. An employee of the public body prepared and maintained the calendar. The public body used the calendar to schedule official meetings and other governmental events. Additionally, an unspecified number of members of the public body had access to the calendar.

The public body violated the requirements of FOIA by failing to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that portions of the records are exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(f)(exemption for predecisional and deliberative material) or section 7(1)(m). The public body did not meet its burden to redact information pursuant to 7(1)(m) because it failed to demonstrate that the redacted information could reveal the substance of confidential attorney-client discussions. The simple presence of an attorney in a meeting is not enough to demonstrate that section 7(1)(m) applies.

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

Shanell M. Bowden, IASB Law Clerk

The Illinois Supreme Court has held that a school district is subject to, and its school board must comply with, local government zoning and storm water restrictions, i.e., a city’s zoning powers. The case arose when neighbors to a high school didn’t like the bleachers being built in the football stadium. The city issued a stop-order against the board prohibiting the continuation of the work on the bleachers. The neighbors sued the district seeking to privately enforce the city’s zoning ordinances. The court considered the board’s arguments supporting its position that the city may not restrict a school district’s land use. The court disagreed in an opinion that reads like a reply brief. The court relied on a provision in the School Code expressly allowing boards to seek zoning changes, variations, or special new uses for properties held or controlled by the school district. The court reasoned that this provision demonstrates that the legislature intended to subject the local school board to the municipality’s zoning regulations.