Recent Court Decisions

A public body violated FOIA by failing to comply with, deny in whole or in part, or otherwise appropriately respond to a FOIA request. An individual submitted a request via email on Jan. 4, 2017 for a copy of a police report and documents related to a police pursuit that began in East St. Louis on the morning of Dec. 13, 2016. Twelve days after making the request, the requestor had yet to receive a response and requested the PAC review the City’s failure to respond. The City did not respond to the PAC’s first correspondence regarding this matter, but it responded to the PAC’s second correspondence by indicating that the request had been forwarded to the Police and City Attorney. On March 1, 2017, the requestor resubmitted her FOIA request and was informed by the City Manager that he would work with the police department to fulfill her Jan. 4, 2017 request. As of April 18, 2017, the City had not responded to the FOIA request.

The PAC found that the City violated Section 3(d) of FOIA by failing to provide the requested records, to extend the time for its response, or to deny the request in whole or in part within five business days of receiving the request. The PAC ordered the City to immediately provide all records in response to the FOIA requestor, subject only to any permissible redactions under Section 7. Again, the bottom line here is that public bodies must respond to FOIA requests within the time permitted per statute.

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

Cassandra Black, IASB Law Clerk

Petitioner Endrew F., a student with autism, attended school in Douglas County from preschool to fourth grade and received special education services through an Individualized Education Program (IEP) during this time. When the District proposed his fifth grade IEP, Endrew’s parents removed him from public school and unilaterally placed him at a private school that specializes in educating students with autism because they did not believe he was making meaningful progress on his IEP goals. During the fall of Endrew’s fifth grade year, the District proposed a new IEP, but parents rejected it claiming that the final IEP proposed by the District did not provide Endrew with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), as is required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Endrew’s parents filed a complaint seeking reimbursement for private tuition. In response to parents’ claim, an Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the District. The District Court and Tenth Circuit affirmed this decision.

The Supreme Court first addressed the FAPE requirement 35 years ago in Board of Education of Hendricks Hudson Central School District v. Rowley. The Rowley court held that a student has received FAPE if the student’s IEP is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” The Rowley court stated that for students who are receiving instruction in the regular classroom, this would typically require an IEP “reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.”

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the Rowley decision that for students included in the general education environment, an IEP should typically be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.” The Court recognized, however, that this standard may not be appropriate for all students with disabilities, and for students not included in the general education setting IDEA requires that the IEP be “appropriately ambitious in light of [the student’s] circumstances.” The Court held that the substantive obligation under IDEA requires a district to offer an “educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” While this standard is significantly more demanding that the “merely more than de minimis” standard applied by the Tenth Circuit, it is less demanding than the parents’ proposed standard that students with disabilities be provided with educational opportunities that are “substantially equal to the opportunities afforded children without disabilities.” The Court declined to elaborate on what “appropriate” progress looks like, stating that this will depend on the unique circumstances of each child. The Court stated that when a court is reviewing the IEP, it must look at whether the IEP is “reasonable,” not whether it is “ideal,” and that deference should continue to be given to school authorities based on the application of expertise and exercise of judgment.

Cassandra Black, IASB Law Clerk

Petitioner E.F., a student with cerebral palsy, had a service dog recommended by her pediatrician to help her with daily life activities. When E.F. was in kindergarten, her parents requested that the service dog accompany E.F. to school. The School District denied this request on the basis that the human aide assigned to E.F. through her Individualized Education Program (IEP) was able to address E.F.’s needs, rendering the service dog unnecessary. E.F.’s parents began homeschooling E.F. and filed a complaint with the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR), claiming that the exclusion of E.F.’s service animal was a violation of her rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504). After OCR found in favor of E.F., the school invited E.F. to return to school with the service dog. Parents opted to enroll E.F. in another school district and then filed suit in federal court against the local and regional school district and principal (School Districts), alleging they violated the ADA and Section 504 by denying E.F. equal access to the school and its programs, refusing to reasonably accommodate E.F.’s use of a service dog, and discriminating against E.F., seeking declaratory and monetary relief. The District Court granted the School Districts’ motion to dismiss the suit, holding that §1414(l) of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) required E.F. to first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The U.S. Supreme Court, in an 8-0 ruling, held that exhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative procedures is unnecessary when the essence of the complaint is something other than the denial of IDEA’s core guarantee of a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE). Because the only relief provided through IDEA’s administrative procedures is relief for the denial of FAPE, this must be the substance of the plaintiff’s complaint for IDEA’s administrative procedures to apply. If a suit is brought under a different statute, such as the ADA or Section 504, and the relief sought is not for the denial of a FAPE, exhaustion of the IDEA’s procedures is not required.

The Court stated that courts must look at the substance of a claim to determine if a plaintiff is seeking relief for the denial of FAPE. The Court provided two questions to help determine whether the substance of the claim is denial of FAPE. First, “Could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school—say, a public theater or library?” Second, “Could an adult at the school—say an employee or visitor—have pressed essentially the same grievance?” If the answer to either question is yes, is it not likely that the complaint is about FAPE. If the answer to both questions is no, however, it is likely that the complaint does concern FAPE. The Court also suggested another clue that the case is about a denial of FAPE can be ascertained by looking at the history of the proceedings. If the plaintiff initially sought relief through IDEA’s administrative remedies, this may suggest the substance of the claim is a denial of FAPE.

The Court has remanded the case back to the Sixth Circuit to determine whether the Frys utilized the IDEA’s dispute resolution process prior to filing a federal suit. If so, the Sixth Circuit needs to determine whether the Frys’ actions indicate that the substance of their complaint is related to a denial of FAPE, thus requiring further exhaustion of IDEA’s administrative procedures.

This decision means that a plaintiff can bring a suit under antidiscrimination statutes such as the ADA or Section 504, without first exhausting IDEA’s administrative procedures if the gravamen of the complaint is not relief sought for the denial of FAPE.

Cassandra Black, IASB Law Clerk

A public body violated FOIA by improperly denying a request under Section 7(1)(d)(i). The requestor requested an Illinois State Police (ISP) field report. ISP responded by denying the request in its entirety under 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA, claiming that disclosure of the requested information “would interfere with pending or actually and reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceeding[s] conducted by [a] law enforcement agency.” When a public body denies a request claiming statutory exemption, the burden is on the governmental agency to prove that specific documents fit within the statutory exemption.

The PAC found that while ISP’s response to the FOIA included the statutory language of Section 7(1)(d)(i), it did not provide a “detailed factual basis” for its application as is required by Section 9(a). The PAC concluded that ISP did not sustain its burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the field report is exempt from disclosure in its entirety.

The PAC ordered ISP to immediately disclose the field report to the requestor. In response to ISP’s claim that the report contains information that is exempt, the PAC stated ISP may redact from the report any “private information” which is exempt under 7(1)(b) and dates of birth which are exempt under Section 7(1)(c), but if ISP redacts any information, it must include a written denial that identifies the basis for each redaction and other requirements of Section 9(a).

This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

Cassandra Black, IASB Law Clerk

A school board met in closed session to discuss the possibility of entering into a separation agreement with the then-Superintendent. The Superintendent signed and dated the agreement during the closed meeting. During a subsequent closed meeting, six of seven board members signed but did not date the agreement. Next, the Board posted the agenda for a subsequent open meeting on its website, listing an item to approve the resolution and separation agreement between the Superintendent and Board. The agenda identified the Superintendent by name and contained a link to the full text of the separation agreement. At the open meeting, the Board read the agenda item and full text of the resolution, conducted a roll call vote, and approved the resolution and agreement. The Attorney General found the Board violated OMA, stating that by signing the agreement in closed session the Board took final action, and the Board did not adequately inform the public of the nature of the matter under consideration. The circuit court reversed this decision and the appellate court affirmed.

The Attorney General then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which agreed with the lower courts and found in favor of the Board. The Court held that under Section 2(e) of OMA, a public recital must take place at the open meeting before the matter is voted upon, and the recital must announce the nature of the matter being considered. Adequate detail to identify the particular issue is required, but this does not require an explanation of its terms or significance. The Court also held that here, reading the agenda item and full text of the resolution before taking a roll call vote satisfied OMA. The Court further clarified that final action does not, as the Attorney General claimed, require a board to provide a detailed explanation about the significance or impact of the proposed final action.

The decision means that during a validly conducted closed session, board members may continue to express their individual positions without fear they are taking impermissible final action. Activities in closed session like taking a straw poll or signing a document are permissible provided the board later takes final action in a properly conducted open session.

Cassandra Black, IASB Law Clerk