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Recent Court Decisions

Recent court and agency decisions involving board work

IASB's Office of General Counsel prepares summaries chosen from the Illinois Supreme and Appellate courts, federal court, agencies, the Illinois Public Access Counselor, and other tribunals issuing interesting decisions. Information in the summaries is limited to a brief synopsis and is not intended for purposes of legal advice. For the complete text of any case cited in this section, go to the Illinois state courts, Illinois Attorney General, or Federal courts finder links.

To search by the names of the plaintiff or defendant or other keyword, use the site search box located at the top of this website. Then filter results by Court Decision.

Questions regarding Recent Court and Agency Decisions should be directed to Maryam Brotine, ext. 1219, or by mbrotine@iasb.com.

Court decisions are listed in order of the date posted, with the most recent shown first.
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  • Freedom of Information Act - FOIA
    Duty to Respond to FOIA Requests
    Case: Public Access Opinion 23-011
    Decision Date: Wednesday, July 12, 2023
    On March 15, 2023, Petitioner submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to Proviso Township High School District 209 (District) seeking copies of “any and all records related to legal or other kinds of settlements reached by the district or any of its employees from June 30, 2020, to February 28, 2023.” The District did not respond.

    On March 27, 2023, Petitioner submitted a Request for Review with the Public Access Counselor (PAC) alleging that the District failed to respond to her FOIA request. On March 31, 2023, the PAC forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the District along with a letter asking whether the District has responded to Petitioner’s FOIA request. The District did not respond.

    On April 27, 2023, the PAC sent a second copy of the letter and Request for Review to the District, explaining that the PAC had not received any indication that the District had responded to the FOIA request. The District did not respond. On that same day, Petitioner provided the PAC with a copy of an April 19, 2023, letter from the District indicating she would receive a response to her FOIA request on April 30, 2023. On May 2, 2023, Petitioner confirmed she had not received that response.

    On May 4, 2023, in a telephone call, the District’s FOIA officer at the time confirmed receipt of the March 15, 2023 FOIA request and indicated that the District was working on its response. On May 16, 2023, the PAC re-sent its April 27, 2023 letter to the FOIA officer and asked for an update. The District did not respond.

    On May 25, 2023, June 14, 2023, and June 22, 2023, the PAC left voicemail messages for a new designated FOIA officer for the District, asking her to contact the PAC to discuss the Request for Review. The PAC received no response.

    On July 3, 2023, the PAC e-mailed the District’s FOIA officer asking for an update as to when the District would respond to the FOIA request. On July 10, 2023, she replied via e-mail indicating that she would work with the Superintendent on a response to the request. As of July 12, 2023, the PAC had received no indication that the District had responded to the FOIA request.

    Section 3(d) of FOIA provides that “each public body shall, promptly, either comply with or deny a request for public records within 5 business days after its receipt of the request, unless the time for response is properly extended under subsection (e) of this Section.”

    The PAC concluded that the District violated Section 3(d) of FOIA by failing, within the statutory time for responding to a FOIA request, to provide Petitioner with copies of the requested records or to deny the request in writing in whole or in part. The PAC directed the District to take immediate and appropriate action to provide Petitioner with copies of all records responsive to her request, subject only to permissible redactions, if any, under Section 7 of FOIA.

    This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

    Mary H. Bandstra, IASB Law Clerk
  • Freedom of Information Act - FOIA
    Police Reports Concerning Public Employee Arrested and Charged with Crimes Against a Minor are Not Exempt from Disclosure in the Entireties under the Personal Privacy Exemption
    Case: Public Access Opinion 23-009
    Decision Date: Friday, June 16, 2023
    On March 22, 2023, Reporter submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the South Beloit (City) Police Department (Department), seeking copies of all Department documents “with the redactions to the juvenile victim’s name and other identifying information,” concerning a former teacher and coach at South Beloit Junior High School who had been charged in 2009 with indecent solicitation, criminal sexual assault, and battery involving a student.

    The Department denied the request in its entirety pursuant to Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA, asserting that “[d]ue to the status of the victim as a juvenile at the time of the offense, and due to the nature of the offense, disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”. The Department additionally stated that “there were no other recorded incidents involving [teacher] within the South Beloit Police Department.”

    Reporter replied to the Department, disputing its denial by contending that it “has not shown how the victim in this case can be identified, even after the juvenile victim’s name and any other identifying information have been redacted.” City’s responded  that the denial was proper, stating, “My review of the requested police reports reveal that the reports contain detailed, sensitive, and extremely personal statements regarding assault and battery of a sexual nature against a juvenile.”

    Reporter submitted a Request for Review to the Public Access Counselor (PAC) contesting the denial of her request. The PAC sent a copy of the Request for Review to the City’s attorney, along with a letter requesting unredacted copies of any withheld records for the PAC’s confidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the bases for the applicability of the Section 7(1)(c) exemption. City’s attorney responded, and the PAC forwarded the response letter to Reporter, but Reporter notified the PAC that she would stand on her original complaint.

    Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure “[p]ersonal information contained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Section 7(1)(c) defines “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” as “the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject’s right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining the information.”

    The PAC concluded that the Department violated the requirements of FOIA by denying Reporter’s request in its entirety. The PAC found that there is legitimate public interest in disclosure of information concerning criminal offenses committee by a public school teacher against a minor student, and noted that the student’s identifying information, and any “graphic or salacious details of any sexual offense,” could be redacted to protect the student’s privacy interests.

    The PAC directed the Department to provide Reporter with copies of the responsive records, subject to the redaction of the victim’s identifying information and limited graphic details. Additionally, the PAC told the Department it may redact information that meets the plain language of the definition of “private information” under Section 7(1)(b) of FOIA, and information that would unavoidably identify members of the public who provided the Department with information relating to the investigation under Section 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA.

    This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

    Mary H. Bandstra, IASB Law Clerk

     
  • General Interest to School Officials
    In a Criminal “True Threat” Case, the First Amendment Requires Proof that Defendant had a Subjective Understanding that his Statements were Threatening
    Case: Counterman v. Colorado, 143 S. Ct. 2106 (2023)
    Decision Date: Tuesday, June 27, 2023
    True threats of violence are outside the bounds of First Amendment protection and punishable as crimes. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that in a criminal case, the State must show that the Defendant acted with recklessness and had some subjective understanding of the threatening nature of his statements.

    From 2014 to 2016, Defendant-Appellant Billy Counterman sent hundreds of Facebook messages to C.W., a local singer and musician. These included messages that suggested Counterman was surveilling her and that she may come to harm. C.W. suffered from severe anxiety due to these messages, believing that Counterman was threatening her life. Eventually, C.W. contacted the authorities.

    Colorado charged Counterman under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18–3–602(1)(c), which states that it is illegal to “[r]epeatedly ... make[ ] any form of communication with another person” in “a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress and does cause that person ... to suffer serious emotional distress.” The only evidence the State introduced were his Facebook messages. At trial, Counterman was found guilty.

    Counterman appealed. The Colorado law applies an objective standard, looking only at whether a reasonable person would have viewed the Facebook messages as threatening. Instead, Counterman claimed that the First Amendment demands a subjective standard, requiring the State to show that he was aware of the threatening nature of his statements.

    The Supreme Court noted that there are categories of speech that are historically unprotected by the First Amendment, as they are of “such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest” in forbidding them. These include true threats, incitement, defamation, obscenity, and others.

    However, the Supreme Court reasoned that the First Amendment still requires a subjective mental-state requirement to prevent a chilling effect on otherwise protected speech. The Supreme Court held that the lowest level of mental states is sufficient to balance enough breathing space for protected speech without sacrificing too many of the benefits of enforcing laws against true threats. The Supreme Court held that recklessness, or awareness that listeners could regard one’s statements as threatening violence, is the proper standard to apply.

    The Supreme Court vacated the lower court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

    While this case is not binding in Illinois and involves a state criminal law, the Supreme Court’s focus on a speaker’s subjective intent to make a “true threat” is noteworthy and may impact how schools analyze if expression is a “true threat” exempt from First Amendment protection.

    Michelle Yang, IASB Law Clerk
     
  • Freedom of Information Act - FOIA
    Improper Assessment of Fee for Non-Commercial Request
    Case: Public Access Opinion 23-008
    Decision Date: Friday, May 26, 2023
    On February 15, 2023, Requestor, on behalf of the non-profit organization Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Council), submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to St. Clair County (County) seeking records regarding flood-related home buyout programs.

    Requestor stated that the purpose of the request is to procure information that will assist vulnerable communities in deciding whether to participate in the Flood Hazard Mitigation program and other similar programs. The County estimated approximately 650 pages of responsive records and a fee of $220, pursuant to Section 6(b) for cost of physical copies of the records and Section 6(f) for cost of searching for and redacting the records. Later, the County found more than 3,000 pages of responsive records and assessed an updated fee of $1,000, pursuant to the same sections.

    Section 6(b) of FOIA states that a public body may charge reasonable fees to reimburse its actual cost for physically reproducing and certifying public records. In calculating the actual cost, the public body may not include the costs of any search for and review of the records or other personnel costs associated with reproducing the records.

    Section 6(f) of FOIA states that a public body may charge fees for personnel costs, including searching for and redacting records, but only for commercial requests.

    On review, the Public Access Counselor (PAC) noted that the County must have treated the request as one with a commercial purpose, as the County cited Section 6(f) for part of the fees. Looking at the definition of “commercial purpose” set out in Section 2(c-10), the PAC held that the request had a non-commercial purpose as there was no indication that the Council intended to use the records for “sale, resale, or solicitation or advertisement for sales or services.”

    The PAC ordered the County to provide the Requestor with copies of the responsive records, subject only to permissible fees for copying under Section 6(a) (records in electronic formats should be provided in an electronic format if possible, with fees charged for cost of the recording medium). No fees should be charged for the search for and review of records.

    This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

    Michelle Yang, IASB Law Clerk
     
  • Freedom of Information Act - FOIA
    Failing to Provide Employee Names/Email Addresses in FOIA Request Insufficient to be “Unduly Burdensome"
    Case: Public Access Opinion 23-007
    Decision Date: Friday, May 26, 2023
    On February 16, 2023, Requestor submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the City of Chicago Department of Planning and Development (Department) seeking “all emails, sent or received by [the Department], or circulated internally to the Department, in calendar year 2021, emails all or in part regarding the City-owned property at 6435-6445 N California Ave, commonly known as the former Northtown branch of the Chicago Public Library, and all emails containing any of the following keywords …”

    The Department responded that the Requestor must provide (1) the name or email address of the employee, (2) the timeframe for the email search, and (3) any specific keywords for the search. The Department noted that failing to provide all of the search parameters would require reviewing all emails to determine whether they are relevant to the request, which would be unduly burdensome.

    Section 3(g) of FOIA states that public bodies must comply with requests for all records within a category unless compliance would be unduly burdensome. If compliance is unduly burdensome, the public body must specify the reasons why compliance would be unduly burdensome and the extent to which compliance would burden the operations of the public body.

    On review, the Public Access Counselor (PAC) noted that Requestor had only failed to provide the names/email addresses of employees. Since a public body is typically in a better position than a member of the public to know the names and email addresses of public employees who would have records relating to particular subjects and FOIA only requires that a request reasonably identify a public record, the PAC held that simply failing to provide names/email addresses of specific employees is insufficient to be unduly burdensome. Rather than searching every account, public bodies must make judgment calls about the appropriate personnel to consult.

    This opinion is binding only to the parties involved and may be appealed pursuant to State law.

    Michelle Yang, IASB Law Clerk